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LOCHNER'S FEMINIST LEGACY 
David E. Bernstein* 
CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW, 
AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS. By 
Julie Novkov. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2001 . Pp. xii, 
320. $44.50. 
Professor Julie Novkov's Constituting Workers, Protecting Women1 
examines the so-called Lochner era of American constitutional 
jurisprudence through the lens of the struggle over the 
constitutionality of "protective" labor legislation, such as maximum 
hours and minimum wage laws. Many of these laws applied only to 
women, and Novkov argues that the debate over the constitutionality 
of protective laws for women - laws that some women's rights advo­
cates saw as discriminatory legislation against women - ultimately 
had important implications for the constitutionality of protective labor 
legislation more generally . 
Liberally defined, the Lochner era2 lasted from the Slaughter­
House Cases in 1873 - in which four Supreme Court Justices advo­
cated strong constitutional protection for occupational liberty3 -
through the triumph of the New Deal in the late 1930s. In preparing­
her book, Novkov apparently unearthed and read every reported fed­
eral and state case on protective labor legislation duringthe relevant 
time period.4 Having tabulated these cases, Novkov finds that both 
federal and state courts were much more likely to uphold women's 
protective legislation than to uphold general protective labor legisla­
tion. In fact, decisions affirming the constitutionality of women's pro­
tective legislation often paved the way for later sex-neutral legislation. 
Novkov usefully divides the Lochner era into four distinct periods. 
As discussed below, Novkov's analysis of these periods is not fully 
* Professor, George Mason University School of Law. J.D. 1991, Yale; B.A. 1988, 
Brandeis. - Ed. Sandra Van Burkleo, Daniel Ernst, Richard Friedman, and Nancy Woloch 
provided helpful comments on this Review, and George Mason's Law and Economics 
Center provided financial support. 
1. Assistant. Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon. 
2. Named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) . 
3. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
4. Unfortunately, Novkov neither provides an appendix listing the cases she considered, 
nor provides an explanation of what criteria a case needed to meet to be considered protec­
tive legislation. 
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persuasive. The four periods she delineates, however, do track major 
shifts in Supreme Court doctrine  regarding the government's power to 
regulate labor (and to regu late the economy more generally), and will 
be used to frame this Review. Part I of this Review discusses Supreme 
Court jurisprudence regarding protective labor legislation from 
1873-1897. Novkov refers to this period as the "era of generalized 
balancing," in which  "the tension between liberty and police power 
emerged as the central focus of claims grounded in due process" 
(p. 32). 
Part  II of this Review discusses what Novkov calls the "era of spe­
cific balancing," which lasted from 1898-1910. According to Novkov, 
this period saw a significant increase in legislation regulating labor 
contracts, including legislation that applied only to women workers 
(p. 33). Novkov asserts that courts began to focus on the types of labor 
legislatures sought to regulate, distinguishing between the prototypical 
male laborer in an "ordinary" occupation on the one hand, and classes 
of laborers considered legitimately in need of government  assistance 
on the other. In 1908, in Muller v. Oregon,5 the Supreme Court af­
firmed the constitutionality of maximum hours laws for women. 
In the ensuing period of "laborer-centered analysis" between 1911 
and 1923, discussed in Part III of this Review, courts focused on "the 
justifications that could be used to show that protective labor legisla­
tion for women was legitimate" (p. 33). During this era, the Supreme 
Court was inclined to uphold protective legislation. Advocates of 
protective laws for women gradually shifted their argument from 
women's natural disabilities to more general "laborer-centered" ar­
guments that necessitous workers of any sex were not truly free. The 
constitutionality of maximum hours laws for male factory workers was 
established during this period. 
Finally, Part IV of this Review discusses the period from 1923 
through 1937, which Novkov refers to as an era of "gendered rebal­
ancing" (p. 34). The focus of efforts to enact protective legislation 
shifted once again to laws that applied exclusively to women, espe­
c ially minimum wage laws. The era began with the Supreme Court 
overturning a minimum wage law for women in Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital,6 on the grounds that women have the same right to liberty of 
contract as men. It ended with the Court upholding a similar law in 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.7 In West Coast Hotel, the Court adopted 
the argument that allowing women workers with unequal bargaining 
power to negotiate contracts for themselves for less than a living wage 
cannot be considered liberty at all. 
5. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
6. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
7 .  300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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As discussed in this Review, throughout Constituting Workers, 
Protecting Women, Novkov provides an interesting and generally 
well-researched narrative regarding the debate over the 
constitutionality and wisdom of protective labor legislation for 
women. She sometimes shows great scholarly care, rejecting some 
hoary and popular myths about the Lochner era. Novkov notes, for 
example, that Lochner itself was something of an aberration in its 
time, one of the very few cases invalidating protective labor legislation 
before the 1920s. 
On the other hand, Novkov seems overly enamored with applying 
the concept of "nodes of conflict" to the controversy over protective 
laws for women. She defines nodes of conflict as "a point at which the 
public , attorneys, and the courts are all in communication " (p. 20). 
This Reviewer did not find the nodes of conflict concept especially 
enlightening, and suspects that it distracted Novkov from taking 
a more nuanced approach to the history of the controversy over 
protective labor laws. In particular , as discussed in Part  V of this 
Review, Novkov ignores relevant economic issues, overemphasizes the 
role of legal argument in explaining constitutional development, and 
overstates the relative importance of the debate over protective laws 
for women to the more general debate over constitutional limits on 
the government's regulatory power. 
I. TH E ERA OF GENERALIZED BALANCING, 1873-1898 
Novkov appropriately begins her study of the constitutional 
conflict over protective labor legislation for women with an analysis 
of two cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1873 - the 
Slaughter-House Cases8 and Bradwell v. lllinois.9 In Slaughter-House, 
four dissenting Justices vigorously argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause protected the right to 
earn a living from infringement by government-established monopoly. 
The right articulated in the Slaughter-House dissents eventually 
evolved into the right to pursue an occupation free from unreasonable 
government  interference enforced by the Lochner Court. 
In Bradwell, by contrast, three of the four dissenting 
Slaughter-House Justices concurred in the Court's ruling that Illinois 
could prohibit women from practicing law. They reasoned that "[t]he 
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female 
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of c ivil life . . . . The 
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble 
and benign offices of wife and mother ."10 The contrast between the 
8. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
9. 83 U .S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) . 
10. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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Slaughter-House dissents and the Bradwell concurrence shows that 
what Novkov calls the "gendered" nature of liberty of contract doc­
trine under the Fourteenth Amendment was already ·established in the 
1870s. 
Because the Slaughter-House majority eviscerated the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, attorneys challenging economic regulations turned 
to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses. By the 1890s, state courts were regularly issuing decisions 
invalidating various protective laws as "class legislation" under the 
Equal Protection Clause or as violations of liberty of contract  under 
the Due Process Clause. 1 1  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, inter­
preted the prohibition on class legislation narrowly12 and had not yet 
adopted the liberty of contract  doctrine. 
With regard to protective legislation limited to women workers, 
most of the litigation during this era involved laws that banned women 
from serving alcohol. 1 3  Only two of the cases during this era involved 
sex-based protective laws for women in industry, a category which was 
soon to be the focal point of a great deal of litigation. In 1876, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld a maximum hours law for 
women because the statute "merely provides that in an employment, 
which the Legislature has evidently deemed to some extent dangerous 
to health, no person shall be engaged in labor more than ten-hours a 
day or sixty-hours a week." 14 
The other sex-based protective-law case, Ritchie v. People,15 
involved an Illinois law limiting women to an eight-hour work day. 
Novkov does not discuss the history of this law, but other historians 
have done so. A broad coalition of women's reform groups had lob­
bied for the law.16 These groups believed that women were unable to 
compete on equal terms with men in the workplace and therefore 
needed legislative intervention on their behalf to  protect them from 
overwork. In contrast, almost all of the women workers who appeared 
11. Novkov focuses her attention on courts' reliance on liberty of contract under 
the Due Process Clause. P. 51. For a discussion of the relationship between the equal 
protection and due process decisions, see David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Re­
vised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2003). 
12. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). 
13. Courts routinely upheld these laws as part of the states' police power to regulate al­
cohol consumption. Pp. 48-49. 
14. Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383, 384 (1876). For a discussion 
of the origins of this law, see Renee D. Toback, Protective Labor Legislation for Women: 
The Massachusetts Ten-Hour Law (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts) (on file with author). 
15. 40 N.E. 454, 455 (Ill. 1895). 
16. Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on 
Feminist Community, Illinois, 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1520 (1986). 
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at trial testified that they preferred to work longer hours to get higher 
pay. '7 
When a challenge to the law reached the state supreme court in 
1895, Illinois argued that women 's biological differences from men, 
combined with their unique role in bearing offspring, justif ied the ex­
ercise of the state police power on women's behalf . 18 In response, 
Ritchie's attorney contended that women had full citizenship rights 
and that the law deprived women of their right to make a living. 19 The 
brief quoted libertarian treatise author Christopher Tiedeman for the 
proposition that "the constitutional guaranty of the liberty of contract  
applies to women, married or single, as  well as  men. "20 
The Illinois Supreme Court sided with Ritchie. Novkov asserts that 
Ritchie "did not take much notice of the female workers affected by 
the statute at issue in the case" (p. 61), "ignore[d] gender" (p. 101), 
and did not "refer to gender specifically" (p. 124 ). This reading of 
Ritchie is inexplicable. While it's true that the Illinois Supreme Court 
"saw no need to reason differently about police power simply because 
the workers involved . . .  happened to be female" (p. 71), the court did 
not ignore the sex of the workers regulated by the hours law. 
To the contrary, Ritchie contains rousing feminist language, albeit 
language reflecting a libertarian classical liberal and individualist 
feminism,21 rather than the "social feminism"22 of the reformers who 
supported maximum hours laws. While the court acknowledged that 
the state had the power to protect workers who might injure 
themselves or others, it denied that the state could create a blanket 
distinction between male and female workers: 
[W]oman is entitled to the same rights, under the constitution, to make 
contracts with reference to her labor as are secured thereby to men .... 
The law accords to her, as to every other citizen, the natural right to gain 
a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, the sci­
ences, the professions, or other vocations. Before the law, her right to a 
17. Nancy S. Erickson, Muller v. Oregon Reconsidered: The Origins of a Sex-Based 
Doctrine of Liberty of Contract, 30 LAB . HIST. 228, 241 (1989). 
18. See Lori Ann Kran, Gendered Law: A Discourse Analysis of Labor Legislation, 
1890-1930, at 50-51 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts) (on 
file with the Harvard University Law Library). 
19. Id. at 52-53. 
20. Id. at 53 (quoting CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND 
FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 336 (2d ed. 1900)). 
21 .  See generally JOAN KENNEDY TAYLOR, RECLAIMING THE MAINSTREAM: 
INDIVIDUALIST FEMINISM REDISCOVERED (1992) (presenting a modern restatement); Mark 
G. Yudoff, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer for 
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366 (1990) (book review) (discussing 
the relationship between classical liberalism and women's rights). 
22. See Sybil Lipschultz, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
131 (1989). 
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choice of vocations cannot be said to be denied or abridged on account 
of sex.23 
Ritchie outraged reformers. Consider , for example, the reaction of 
Florence Kelley. Kelley was the primary author of , and most impor­
tant lobbyist for, Illinois's maximum hours law, and had been charged 
as Chief Illinois Factory Inspector with enforcing it.24 She exclaimed 
that "the measure passed to guarantee the Negro freedom from 
oppression [the Fourteenth Amendment] has become an insuperable 
obstacle to the protection of women and children."25 Kelley apparently 
assumed that the legal statuses of women and children were necessar­
ily the same, when in fact women 's rights as citizens were gaining legal 
and judicial recognition.26 In contrast to Kelley's reaction ,  a writer who 
supported Ritchie stated "that women are citizens, capable of making 
their own contracts, particularly in states where they have the right of 
suffrage, such legislation restricting their hours of labor is unconstitu­
tional . . .  as class legislation of the worst sort  . . . .  "27 Thus, contrary to 
Novkov's understanding of this period, contrasting views regarding 
women's r ights and abilities were already playing a large role in the 
debate over the constitutionality of protective legislation . 
II. THE ERA OF SPECIFIC BALANCING, 1898-1910 
1898 was a crucial year for protective labor legislation. In Holden 
v. Hardy, the Supreme Court upheld a Utah law mandating a maxi­
mum eight-hour day for underground miners, despite arguments that 
the law was class legislation and infringed upon liberty of contract.28 
Justice Brown,  writing  for a seven-vote majority, found that the stat­
ute was an "exercise of a reasonable discretion" by the legislature, and 
not class legislation.29 The Court also held that the law's infringement 
on liberty of contract was justified in order to redress inequalities in 
bargaining power between workers and their employers.30 In short, 
23. People v. Ritchie, 40 N.E. 454, 458 (Ill .  1895). 
24. See Erickson, supra note 17, at 236; Kran, supra note 18, at 49-50. 
25. JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, IMPATIENT CRUSADER: FLORENCE KELLEY'S LIFE STORY 
144 (1953). For other negative commentary on Ritchie, see ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE 
POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, § 313, at 298 (1904), and 
Comment, 4 YALE L.J. 200, 201 (1895). For more on Kelley, see KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, 
FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION'S WORK (1995). 
26. Throughout this period, none of the opinions invalidating the regulation of women's 
labor stated or implied that states could not regulate child labor. Indeed, the author of this 
Review is unaware of any case in which state regulation of child labor was invalidated. 
27. F.J. STIMSON, HANDBOOK TO THE LABOR LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 64-65 
(1896). 
28. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898). 
29. Id. 
30. /d. at 397. 
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Holden established the government's power to intervene on behalf of 
necessitous workers. 
Although state courts were not bound by Holden in interpreting 
their states' constitutions, the opinion was very influential. State courts 
in Nebraska,31 Pennsylvania,32 and Washington33 upheld maximum 
hours laws for women on the authority of Holden. The Nebraska 
Supreme Court, for example, reasoned that because so few occupa­
tions were open to women, there was great competition for the avail­
able jobs. This led to opportunities for employers to exploit women 
workers and justified legal intervention on their behalf.34 Moreover, 
women had always been considered "wards of the state."35 
Meanwhile, post-Holden U.S. Supreme Court decisions upheld 
general protective labor legislation , such as laws regulating 
employment  on public works projects and laws requiring mining com­
panies to pay their workers in cash and not scrip.36 
Just when the constitutionality of most protective labor legislation 
seemed unassailable, in 1905 the Supreme Court decided the infamous 
case of Lochner v. New York.37 In Lochner, the Supreme Court invali­
dated a maximum hours law for bakers as a violation of liberty of 
contract. Novkov properly understands Lochner as a somewhat 
anomalous case, rather than as a central case from which to begin an 
analysis of the period (p. 87). The Lochner opinion essentially ignored 
the anti-class legislation arguments made in Lochner's brief,38 and in­
stead focused on liberty of contract. The Court held that the states' 
police power did not encompass regulations that protected males 
working in ordinary occupations. Ordinary occupations were those 
that posed no special health risks to the workers themselves or to the 
public at large (pp. 108-110). 
In People v. Williams, the New York Court of Appeals, relying on 
Lochner, invalidated a law that prohibited women from working at 
night. The court rejected the constitutionality of special regulations for 
women workers, propounding instead a "radical vision of equality" (p. 
101). The court stated, 
31. Wenham v. State, 91 N.W. 421 (Neb. 1902). 
32. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Super. 5, 8-9 (1900). 
33. State v. Buchanan, 70 P. 52 (Wash. 1902). 
34. Wenham, 91 N.W. at 425. 
35. Id. at 424-25. 
36. E. g., Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) (upholding a law regulating employment 
on public works projects); Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton, 183 U.S. 23 (1901) (upholding 
a law requiring mining companies to pay their workers in cash); Knoxville Iron Co. v. 
Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (1901) (same). 
37. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
38. See David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
LA w STORIES (Michael Dorf ed., forthcoming 2003). 
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[A]n adult [woman] is not to be regarded as a ward of the state, or in any 
other light than the man is regarded, when the question relates to the 
business pursuit or calling .... She is entitled to enjoy, unmolested, her 
liberty of person and her freedom to work for whom she pleases, where 
she pleases, and as long as she pleases .... [S)he is not to be made the 
special object of the exercise of the paternal power of the state . . .. 39 
Meanwhile, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a ten-hour day and 
sixty-hour week law for women.40 Reformers marshaled their forces to 
defend this opinion .  After Ritchie, local reform organizations had 
banded together in 1898 (not 1899, as Novkov states) to form the 
National Consumers' League as an umbrella organization to lobby for 
the improvement of industrial standards for workers, especially 
women workers.41 Florence Kelley was soon appointed general secre­
tary and became a national force in reformist citcles.42 Her efforts 
were supported by the newly formed National Women's Trade Union 
League, which tried to organize women workers and also lobbied for 
protective labor legislation (pp. 80-81). These organizations supported 
protective legislatiOn for women both because they thought women 
workers were easily exploited43 and a:s a step toward greater legal pro­
tections for all workers.44 
The reformists knew that the ultimate outcome of the Oregon case 
was crucial to their cause. The Consumers' League hired famed attor­
ney Louis Brandeis to write a Supreme Court· brief defending 
Oregon's maximum hours law. Brandeis apparently decided that a 
frontal attack on Lochner was too risky, even though one member of 
the five-vote majority in that case, Justice Henry Brown, had retired 
and been replaced· by the more liberal Willi am Moody.45 Instead, 
Brandeis resolved to show that women workers were more like the 
39. People v. Williams, 81 N.E. 778, 780 (N.Y. 1907); see also Burcher v. People, 14 
Colo. 495 (1907) (overturning a law setting eight hours as the legal limit for women and chil­
dren working in laundries). 
40. State v. Muller, 85 P. 855 (Or. 1906). See generally BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET 
AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 97-99 (2d ed. 1996). 
41. P. 80; GOLDMARK, supra note 25, at 56-57; SKLAR, supra note 25, at 309; NANCY 
WOLOCH, MULLER V. OREGON: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 28 (1996). 
42. GOLDMARK, supra note 25, at 59. 
43. Well-known reformer Mary Van Kleeck, for example, wrote: 
[W]e are interested in the protection of women workers by wage legislation at this time, 
not particularly because they are women, but because they are underpaid workers and 
underpayment is a social menace whether the worker be a man or woman, but it happens 
that the condition pressed most heavily upon women at this time, and it seems to me that we 
should regard those conditions as unique to women. 
Quoted in VIVIEN HART, BOUND BY OUR CONSTITUTION: WOMEN, WORKERS, AND THE 
MINIMUM WAGE 93 (1994). 
44. Elizabeth Faulkner Baker, At the Crossroads in the Legal Protection of Women in 
Industry, 143 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 265, 267 (1929). 
45. WOLOCH, supra note 41 , at 28. 
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necessitous miners of Holden, in need of state protection, than like the 
sturdy bakers of Lochner. 
As Novkov points out, the Lochner Court had found that baking 
"was not unhealthy either in common understanding, or in scientific 
fact" (p. 108; emphasis added). The scientific facts were provided to 
the Court in an appendix to Lochner's brief, which contained a com­
pilation of medical, scientific , and statistical data.46 Justice Peckham 
clearly relied on this appendix in writing Lochner, as much of his dicta 
about the relative safety of baking tracks information contained in the 
appendix, and he explicitly stated that his opinion was informed by 
"looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupations."47 
Brandeis, then, knew that his job was to appeal both to "common 
knowledge" about the health effects of long hours on women and also 
to present statistical and other evidence in support of restricting 
women's work hours. He prepared a brief that contained an unusually 
concise legal argument that focused on distinguishing Lochner. The 
rest of the brief consisted of hundreds of pages of documents sup­
porting the view that women's work hours should be limited. The brief 
attempted to support "four matters of general knowledge": (1) women 
are physically weaker than men; (2) a woman's ill health could damage 
her reproductive capacity; (3) damage to a woman's health could 
affect the health of her future offspring; and (4) excess hours of labor 
for women are harmful to family life.48 In short, the brief "treats all 
women as mothers or potential mothers; it either conflates the needs 
of families and society with those of women or prefers the former to 
the latter; and it depicts women as weak and defective."49 
The evidence in Brandeis's brief was anecdotal and unscientific . It 
consisted of a "hodgepodge"50 of reports of factory or health inspec­
tors, testimony before legislative investigating committees by 
witnesses such as physicians or social workers, statutes, and quotes 
from medical text in journals, along with similar sources. Ironically, 
just about the only relevant  authority not cited in the brief were 
women workers themselves, whose views were apparently considered 
superfluous.51 
46. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 50-61, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
(No. 292), in 14 LANDMARK BRIEF AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Philip B .  Kunland & Gerhhad Casper eds., 1975). For a discussion, see 
Bernstein, supra note 38. 
47. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59. 
48. This summary is adapted from Erickson, supra note 17, at 247. See also pp. 1 17-20. 
49. WOLOCH, supra note 41, at 32. 
50. OWEN M. FISS, THE TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE 1888-1 910, at 
175 (1993). 
51 .  The only women workers whose views appeared in the brief were bookbinders and 
printers studied in the 1870s. WO LOCH, supra note 41 , at 32. 
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Laundry owner Kurt Muller's brief , by contrast, contained a 
strongly worded appeal for women's equal right to freedom of 
contract.52 Muller's brief ,  relying on the Illinois and New York opin­
ions invalidating protective laws for women, demonstrated the fact  
that "arguments for freedom of contract and sexual equality were 
natural allies; they were branches of the same tree, individualism,"53 
or, more precisely, classical liberalism. On a more pragmatic level, the 
"specter of protective laws now forced employers and their lawyers to 
develop an affinity for sexually egalitarian ideals."54 
The Supreme Court, however, was not yet ready to treat women as 
fully equal citizens entitled to the same degree of liberty of contract  as 
men. The Court upheld the law in an opinion by Justice Brewer. 
Brewer was famously libertarian; his most memorable·opinion stated: 
"The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost pos­
sible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to 
him and his property, is both the limitation and duty of government."55 
He, along with Justice Rufus Peckham, consistently dissented in the 
Court's decisions upholding general protective legislation.56 
Protective laws for women, however, were another matter, and 
Brewer wrote the opinion upholding the Oregon maximum hours law. 
Brewer wrote that "woman's physical structure and the performance 
of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for 
subsistence," especially "when the burdens of motherhood are upon 
her."57 Prolonged work hours had "injurious effects" on women's 
bodies and as "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the 
physical well-being of woman becomes an object  of public interest and 
care in order to preserve the strength . . .  of the race. "58 While 
women's legal rights had been extended, "there is that in her disposi­
tion and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of 
those rights. She will still be where some legislation to protect her 
seems necessary to secure a real equality of right."59 Thus, the 
maximum hours law did not violate the right to liberty of contract. Nor 
was the law improper class legislation. "Woman," Brewer wrote, is 
"properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her 
52. Pp. 97-98. Muller's brief also claimed that laundry work was not especially unhealth-
ful, and therefore the hours law was unconstitutional under Lochner. P. 120. 
53. WOLOCH, supra note 41, at 34. 
54. Id. at 35. 
55. Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
56. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 92 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 
2003). 
57. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 422. 
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protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not 
necessary for men and could not be sustained."60 
Brandeis typically gets credit, including from Novkov (p. 128), for 
persuading the Court to uphold the hours law because of the data 
contained in his brief. Indeed, the so-called "Brandeis Brief" - heavy 
on sociological data and light on legal argument  - became a staple of 
constitutional argument over Progressive reforms. The importance of 
Brandeis's brief in Muller, however , has been exaggerated. While 
Brewer, who certainly had no sympathy for Brandeis's progressivism, 
made the unusual gesture of acknowledging Brandeis's brief in a 
footnote,61 Brewer stated that the brief simply provided evidence of 
the "widespread belief" that long hours of labor were harmful  to 
women and their progeny.62 Because under Holden and Lochner 
either common knowledge or scientific evidence was sufficient to 
justify a regulation that was defended as a health law within the police 
power , Brandeis's brief was largely superfluous.63 
Women reformers were elated with their victory (p. 112). They 
argued that protective measures would actually "enhance women's 
liberty by enabling women to make fairer bargains with their employ­
ers" (p. 96). Even the sexism in the opinion reflected a "maternalist" 
ideology that was widely accepted among the Progressive activists of 
the National Consumers' League and the National Women's Trade 
Union League.64 To the extent they were troubled by some of the 
implications of the opinion for women's r ights, leaders of both groups 
"seemed to agree that abstract commitments to liberty were secondary 
to the concrete task of ensuring better conditions for women's labor" 
(p. 96). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 419 n. l. 
62. Id. at 420. 
63. Erickson reaches the same conclusion, Erickson, supra note 17, at 249, as does Anne 
Dailey. See Anne C. Dailey, Lochner for Women, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1996) (" If 
the Court meant what it said, the statute in Muller would have been upheld even without 
Brandeis's voluminous statistical effort . . . .  "). Dailey, however, errs when she argues that 
"the Muller opinion actually defied the reformist Progressive agenda by promoting an ab­
stract ideal of the virtuous mother." Id. at 1217. The maternalist ideal was in fact promoted 
by Progressive reformers, see infra note 64 and accompanying text, and Brandeis's brief cer­
tainly emphasized the threat to women's maternal obligations posed by industrial labor. 
Indeed, one feminist author blamed Brandeis for introducing into the legal debate "the po­
tential-mothers-of-the-race argument, an argument which, from the inevitability of its 
popular appeal and its imperviousness to embarrassment on grounds of scientific inaccuracy, 
was nothing less than a stroke of genius." Blanche Crozier, Note, Constitutional Law -
Regulation of Conditions of Employment of Women. A Critique of Muller v. Oregon, 13 B.U. 
L. REV. 276, 278 (1933). 
64. On the history and influence of maternalism, see THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING 
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1992). 
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Moreover, Kelley and other reformist leaders believed that protec­
tive laws for women would eventually lead to protective laws for all 
workers, as had occurred in England.65 And if some women workers 
were in the meantime harmed by protective legislation - after the 
Supreme Court ruled against Kurt Muller, he apparently fired all his 
women employees and replaced them with male Chinese, and later 
with deaf mutes66 - that was a small price to pay to advance progres­
sive policies.67 Indeed, some reformers saw women workers as an 
obstac le to their goal of persuading society that employers should be 
required to pay male heads of households a wage sufficient to support 
their families, known in labor-union c ircles as the "family wage" 
(p. 96). The National Consumers' League opposed publicly funded 
daycare, healthcare for working mothers, and any other reform that 
might tempt women to enter the workforce.68 
Novkov, like other writers, suggests that dissension among femi­
nists over the issue of protective legislation for women did not begin in 
earnest until the mid-1910s (p. 133). As early as 1906, however, a 
female economist wrote in the Journal of Political Economy that "no 
one should lose sight of the fact that [protective] legislation is not en­
acted exclusively, or even primarily, for the benefit of women 
themselves."69 Two years later, Muller attracted criticism from some 
feminists. For example, Louisa Harding, writing in The Woman's 
Standard, the official organ of the Iowa Suffrage Association ,  found 
Muller to be an "abominable" decision .70 Restricting women's work 
hours, she argued, "practically amounts to confiscation of whatever 
amount would have been earned during the forbidden hours. "71 
65. WOLOCH, supra note 41, at 9. 
66. Jennifer Friesen & Ronald K.L. Collins, Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon, 69 
AB.A J. 472, 472 (1983). Nancy Woloch's efforts to confirm this assertion have been unsuc­
cessful. E-mail from Nancy Woloch to David Bernstein (Mar. 2, 2003) (on file with author). 
67. See SUSAN LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN, 
1905-1925, at 165 (1987) (explaining that this attitude was denounced by women opponents 
of protective legislation); cf ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER, PROTECTIVE LABOR 
LEGISLATION 437 (1925) (noting that advocates of protective laws for women believed that 
"that the few women who suffer from special protective laws should surrender their individ­
ual interests for the benefit of larger groups of women"); SANDRA F. V ANBURKLEO, 
"BELONGING TO THE WORLD": WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURE 217-18 (2001) ("reformers thought that the social advantages of state intervention 
outweighed losses of freedom, and they knew full well that women paid a steep price for a 
measure of security"). 
68. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST 
FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 33 (2001). 
69. S.P. Breckinridge, Note, Legislative Control of Women's Work, 14 J. POL. ECON. 
107, 108 (1906). 
70. Louisa Harding, Male Socialism, WOMAN'S STANDARD (Waterloo, Iowa), Apr. 
1908, at 2. 
71. Id.; see also Louisa Dana Harding, Pertinent Queries, WOMAN'S TRIB., May 9, 1908, 
at 19 (suggesting that the true aim of women's labor legislation was not to protect women 
1972 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:1960 
III. THE ERA OF LABORER-CENTERED ANALYSIS, 1911-1923 
Muller firmly established the constitutionality of women-only 
hours regulation. Over the next seven years, the Supreme Court issued 
several more rulings upholding maximum hours laws for women, 
including laws that limited women to an eight-hour day.72 Meanwhile, 
state courts acquiesced to Muller (p. 140), including courts that had 
previously advanced strong libertarian arguments against protective 
laws for women. The Illinois Supreme Court  reversed Ritchie and 
upheld a new maximum hours law.73 The court reasoned that 
"woman 's physical structure and the performance of maternal func­
tions place her at a great disadvantage in the battle of life," and there­
fore protective legislation was within the police power .74 The New 
York Court of Appeals, meanwhile, which had previously invalidated 
an hours law for women in Williams, justified a ban on nighttime work 
for women based on "the peculiar functions which have been imposed 
on [women] by nature."75 Cases involving protective legislation for 
women were now established "as a separate category within due proc­
ess" (p. 138). 
Opinions upholding protective laws for women focused "on 
women's biological differences from men and these physical 
differences' impact  on women's health" (p. 139). Many feminist 
reformers would have preferred the courts to instead rely on the per­
ceived need for protection of women workers due to women 's inferior 
socioeconomic position , and the need for government intervention on 
behalf of workers more generally (p. 139). Such socioeconomic argu­
ments soon became more prominent. The National Consumers' 
League filed a brief supporting a minimum wage law for women in 
Stettler v. O'Hara.76 The brief, authored by Brandeis, Goldmark, and 
but to prevent them from being "enabled in some measure to enjoy the pleasure of an inde­
pendent life''); Against Justice Brewer's Decision, WOMAN'S TRIB., May 9, 1908, at 19 (re­
porting that the Women's Henry George League of New York had vociferously denounced 
Muller); Special Legislation for Women, WOMAN'S TRJB., Feb. 29, 1908, at 16 ("The princi­
ple of sex legislation is absolutely wrong and unjust, and no superstructure of justice can be 
built upon it."). 
None of these early critiques by women of protective legislation appear in the bibliogra­
phy of Constituting Worker�� Protecting Women. 
72. See Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 392-94 (1915) (reviewing an eight-hour 
daily maximum for women, as applied to graduate nurses in hospitals); Miller v. Wilson, 
236 U.S. 373, 379-82 (1915) (evaluating statutory limitations of an eight-hour day for women 
in a wide range of occupations); see also Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914) (per curiam) 
(upholding a maximum hours law for women on the authority of Muller); Riley v. 
Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 679-81 (1914) (reviewing a ten-hour daily limit for women 
working in manufacturing or mechanical establishments). 
73. W. C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 91N.E. 695 (Ill. 1910). 
74. P. 122; Wayman, 91 N.E. at 697. 
75. People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 640 (N.Y. 1915); see also p. 154. 
76. 243 U.S. 629 (1917). 
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Felix Frankfurter, claimed that the law should be upheld because 
women were unable to negotiate effectively with their employers for a 
variety of biological and socioeconomic reasons (pp. 144-45). The brief 
also made a nongendered argument in favor of minimum wage laws, 
arguing that " [w]hen no limit exists below which wages may not fall, 
the laborer's freedom is in effect totally destroyed."77 Thus, true 
liberty was not liberty of contract, but the right to a decent wage.78 
Although Novkov gives the Stettler brief a lot of attention , it may 
not have been especially inf luential. Chief Justice (and Lochner dis­
senter) Edward D. White, clearly unimpressed with the brief , sardoni­
cally remarked that he "could compile a brief twice as thick to prove 
that the legal profession ought to be abolished."79 In any event, the 
Stettler Court upheld the law in a four-four per curiam ruling with no 
opinion . Brandeis, who had just joined the Court, recused himself .  Be­
cause he was a c lear fifth vote in favor of upholding the law, the con­
stitutionality of minimum wage laws for women seemed established, 
and such laws spread to states around the country. 
Beyond Stettler, 1917 was a banner year for supporters of protec­
tive labor legislation. The Supreme Court upheld a maximum hours 
law for railroad workers that seemed to guarantee them an increase 
in hourly pay;80 three workmen's compensation . laws;81 and a 
maximum hours law for all (male and female) industrial workers.82 
The latter case, Bunting v. Oregon,83 seemed to vindicate the National 
Consumers' League's strategy of using maximum hours laws for 
women as a wedge to expand the scope of these laws to include all 
workers. Justice McKenna wrote for the Court, "It is now demonstra­
ble that the considerations that were patent as to miners in 1898 are 
today operative, to a greater or less degree, throughout the industrial 
system."84 Holden, and not Lochner, had apparently carried the day. 
Meanwhile, latent feminist opposition to sex-based protective laws 
was gaining institutional support. The Women's League for Equal 
77. P. 145 (quoting Brief for Defendants in Error upon Reargument at 330, Stettler, 243 
U.S. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
78. P. 168. One should note, however, as Novkov does not, that the brief also made 
Muller-type arguments to the Court. For example, the brief asserted the "mother of the 
race" argument, contending that "[t]he health of the race is conditioned upon preserving the 
health of women, the future mothers of the republic." 
79. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 31 
(1968) (quoting Chief Justice Edward D. White). 
80. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 341 (1917). 
81. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. 
Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 224 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U.S. 210, 212-13 (1917). 
82. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1917). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 433. 
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Opportunity was founded in 1915 by women enraged at the 
displacement of thousands of women workers by New York's prohibi­
tion of night work by women.85 Women printers, restaurant  employ­
ees, and streetcar workers had been particularly hard hit.86 Two years 
later , another group of women founded the Equal Rights Association 
to educate the general public about the negative effects of protective 
laws for women .87 The National Federation of Business and 
Professional Women also opposed sex-based protective laws.88 
The most important opponent of protective laws for women was 
the National Women's Party ("NWP") (p. 133). Formerly a radical 
suffragist group, the NWP dissolved after passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment and reconstituted for the purpose of lobbying for passage 
of an Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") that would guarantee 
women full legal equality (p. 186). Progressive reformers, both within 
and without the NWP, urged the NWP to agree to except protective 
laws from the ERA.89 After some hesitation, the NWP, under the 
leadership of Alice Paul, refused.90 Paul and other NWP leaders 
believed that protective laws prevented women from entering 
male-dominated professions and set a dangerous precedent for other 
sex-based legislation .91 
Consistent with the decline of classical liberalism in the United 
States at this time,92 few NWP members supported laissez-faire eco­
nomic policies,93 and indeed, many of them supported protective laws 
85. BAKER, supra note 67, at 425-26. 
86. Id. at 336, 425-26; MAURINE WIENER GREENWALD, WOMEN, WAR, AND WORK: 
THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR l ON WOMEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 4 (1980); 
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE 
UNITED STATES 193-94 (1982); LEHRER, supra note 67, at 167. 
87. BAKER, supra note 67, at 1 90. Neither of these organizations is mentioned by 
Novkov. 
88. See Gail Laughlin, Why an Equal Rights Amendment?, 1 1  EQUAL RTS. 61, 61 (1924) 
(quoting a 1920 resolution of the Federation), available at http://womhist.binghamton.edu/ 
era/doc5.htm. 
89. Nancy F. Cott, Feminist Politics in the 1920's: The National Woman's Party, 71 .I. 
AM. H IST. 43, 61-64 (1984). 
90. See Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The Women's Minimum 
Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 1905-1923, 78 
J. AM. H IST. 188, 221-24 (1991). 
91. Cott, supra note 89, at 56-60. For more on Alice Paul and the NWP, see AMY E. 
BUTLER, Two PATHS TO EQUALITY: ALICE PAUL AND ETHEL M. SMITH IN THE ERA 
DEBATE, 1921 -1929 (2002), and CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI, FROM EQUAL SUFFRAGE TO 
EQUAL RIGHTS: ALICE PAUL AND THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY, 1910-1928 (1986). 
92. See ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR., THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 175-95 
(1955). 
93. Feminist supporters of libertarian-economic policies seem to have congregated in 
the League of Equal Opportunity. LEHRER, supra note 67, at 161-64, 213-14 (finding that 
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that covered all workers (pp. 187, 198), a position the NWP officially 
adopted during the Great Depression (p. 199). Nevertheless, the 
NWP's opposition to sex-based protective laws led to criticism that 
they de facto supported laissez-faire policies and were tools of big 
business.94 NWP leaders retorted that the American Federation of 
Labor ("AFL") - which in the 1910s began to endorse and lobby for 
protective labor legislation that applied only to women, while oppos­
ing such legislation for men95 - supported sex-based protective legis­
lation to keep women from competing for men's jobs.96 
IV. THE ERA OF GENDERED REBALANCING, 1923-1937 
The "era of gendered rebalancing" began with the case of Adkins 
v. Children's Hospital, involving the constitutionality of a federal law 
establishing a minimum wage for women workers in the District of 
Columbia.97 The drafters of the law went out of their way to try to en­
sure that the law could not be deemed "arbitrary" - and therefore a 
violation of due process - by calibrating the required compensation 
with results of studies showing the wage a woman needed to earn to be 
able to afford necessities. 
The D.C. Court of Appeals nevertheless declared the law unconsti­
tutional as a violation of liberty of contract and women's rights. The 
District of Columbia hired Felix Frankfurter to defend the law before 
the Supreme Court. Frankfurter filed a "Brandeis Brief" containing 
members of this group used arguments that "coincided with . . .  old-line notions of laissez­
faire capitalism"). The League, unlike the NWP, opposed gender-neutral protective laws. 
Suzanne La Follette, a disciple of Albert Jay Nock, was a prominent feminist-libertarian 
opponent of protective Jaws for women and for everyone else, though, like Nock, she fa­
vored the rather odd economic theories of Henry George. See SUZANNE LA FOLLETTE, 
CONCERNING WOMEN 175-84 (1926) (discussing her opposition to protective legislation for 
male or female workers). For a brief biography, see Sharon Presley, Susanne La Follette: 
The Freewoman (1999), at http://www.alf.org/papers/LaFollette.html. 
94. MEREDITH TAX, THE RISING OF THE WOMEN 201 (1980); Cott, supra note 89, at 62. 
95. Pp. 96, 152 n.4; HART, supra note 43, at 78; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 68, at 69. 
Minimum wage legislation for women only passed where organized labor was supportive. 
HART, supra note 43, at 69, 83. A contemporary source states that by the early 1930s, the 
AFL was the most important supporter of protective labor legislation, and played that role 
to protect the jobs of its male members from women. Crozier, supra note 63, at 287-88. 
Crozier's note is one of several important sources that surprisingly do not appear in 
Novkov's bibliography. 
96. Cott, supra note 89, at 61. This accusation had some merit. See, e. g. , KESSLER­
HARRIS, supra note 86, at 201-05 (describ.ing labor unions' support of various "protective" 
measures for women because the unions knew the laws would lead to women's exclusion 
from their industries); LEHRER, supra note 67, at 159 (noting that the Iron Molders' Union 
used concerns about women's health to encourage the government to eliminate them from 
high-paying jobs); Jane Norman Smith, Hours Legislation for Women Only, EQUAL RTS., 
Jan. 16, 1932, at 396, 396 (noting that some labor leaders explicitly supported "protective" 
laws for women so that men could take their jobs). 
97. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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over one thousand pages of documentation supporting the law. Unlike 
Brandeis's brief in Muller, however, Frankfurter also spent substantial 
energy on legal argument. Also in contrast to the original Brandeis 
Brief, Frankfurter did not focus on women's purported or assumed 
disabilities, but instead "emphasiz[ed] the fictitious nature of freedom 
of contract when the employee was bargaining for a wage that did not 
meet her cost of living."98 He spent only a page rebutting the lower 
court's suggestion that the law unconstitutionally discriminated against 
women. The brief relied on Muller for the proposition that the legisla­
ture could take differences between men and women into account. 
The opposing brief, meanwhile, made a strong women's rights argu­
ment, relying on information supplied by the NWP.99 
In a surprise to most legal observers, who had believed that 
Lochner was defunct after Bunting,'00 the Court revived Lochner101 
and invalidated the minimum wage law. The Court suggested that the 
law unconstitutionally infringed on liberty of contract in a variety of 
ways, especially by placing an arbitrary , unfair burden on employers to 
support employees lacking the skills to earn a better wage.102 The 
Court also denounced the law as illicit class legislation disfavoring 
women. The Court, in dramatic language, adopted the position that 
women were, after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, fully equal 
98. Pp. 200-01 . Other advocates of protective laws, however, continued to rely on 
"fundamental" "physical and biological differences between men and women" as a rationale 
for protective laws. E. g. , Frances Perkins, Do Women in Industry Need Special Protection? 
Yes, SURV. 529, 530 (1 926) . 
99. See Zimmerman, supra note 90, at 220. 
100. E. g. , Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 564 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting) 
("It is impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner Case, and I have al­
ways supposed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio." ); 3 CHARLES 
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 463 (1 922) (contending that 
Lochner "if not now practically overruled, is certain in the near future to be disregarded by 
the Court"); Edward S. Corwin, Social Insurance and Constitutional Limitations, 26 YALE 
L.J. 431, 432 (l 917) (concluding that Lochner's "[c ]onstitutional rigorism is dead"). 
101. See Thomas I .  Parkinson, Minimum Wage and the Constitlllion, in THE SUPREME 
COURT AND MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION 1 48, 153 (National Consumers' League ed., 
1925) ("[Adkins] suggests that the majority of the Court is disposed to return to the attitude 
of the Court in the Lochner case and to emphasize the individual's right to freedom from 
restraint, rather than the public welfare which justifies legislative restriction of that free­
dom."(emphasis omitted)); Samuel A. Goldberg, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Minimum 
Wage Laws, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 360, 365 (1923) ("Instead of following the policy of previous 
decisions culminating in Bunting v. Oregon . . .  the court has reverted to Lochner v. New 
York, which has always been considered an unfortunate decision and had been supposed to 
have been overruled by Bunting v. Oregon."(footnote omitted)); Francis B. Sayre, The 
Minimum Wage Decision: How the Supreme Court Becomes Virtually a House of Lords, 
SURV., May l ,  1923, at 150, reprinted in SELECTED ARTICLES ON MINIMUM WAGES AND 
MAXIMUM HOURS 1 1 9, 124 (Egbert Ray Nichols & Joseph H. Baccus eds., 1 936) ("Many 
lawyers thought that the much criticized and apparently contrary New York bakeshop deci­
sion of 1 905 had long been virtually overruled . . . .  The latest decision upsets any such 
idea."). 
102. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557-58. 
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c1t1zens, which in turn created a presumption that laws subjecting 
women to special disabilities or allowing special privileges are uncon­
stitutional. While the physical differences between men and women 
could justify certain types of sex-based protective labor legislation, the 
Court could not "accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui 
juris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of 
contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under 
similar circumstances. " 103 
Novkov notes the strong equal rights language in this opinion (p. 
226), but thinks it ironic that "because women now had the ability to 
vote, they could no longer be protected through the legislative proc­
ess . . . .  [T]heir political equality with men had rendered them subject 
to the same deprivations" (p. 226). Novkov fails to note that one of the 
plaintiffs in Adkins losf her job due to the minimum wage law,104 or 
that minimum wage laws often price their "beneficiaries" out of the 
labor market by raising marginal wage rates above marginal produc­
tivity. 
Novkov apparently finds Adkins's women's rights argument a ploy 
- at best superfluous and at worst disingenuous - to cover the 
Court's support of reactionary economic policies.105 After all, the 
Court continued to uphold laws regulating women's work hours, so 
the principle of equality was not consistently applied.106 Yet Adkins's 
author, Justice George Sutherland, had been a leading Senate sup­
porter of the Nineteenth Amendment107 and an adviser to the NWP 
during the ratification battle. He also advised the NWP regarding the 
drafting of the Equal Rights Amendment.108 
103. Id. at 553. Daniel Ernst suggests that the Nineteenth Amendment was significant to 
Sutherland less because it demonstrated public acceptance of women's equality, and more 
because the fact that women could vote opened the possibility that politicians would seek to 
win their votes by promising them special favorable legislation, an idea that raised concerns 
that purportedly protective laws would actually amount to illicit class legislation. Daniel R. 
Ernst, Homework and the Police Power from Jacobs to Adkins, 39 LAB. HIST. 417, 420-22 
(1998) . 
104. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 542-43. 
105. See also Sybil Lipschultz, Hours and Wages: The Gendering of Labor Standards in 
A merica, 8 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 114, 127 (1996) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital made a farce of women's equality."). 
106. Just one year after Adkins, the Court, in an opinion also written by Sutherland, 
upheld a law banning night work for women because common knowledge suggested that 
women have weaker constitutions than men do. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 293-95 
(1924). 
107. See Speech of Senator George Sutherland of Utah, at the Woman Suffrage 
Meeting, Belasco Theater 3-4 (Dec. 13, 1915): 
To my own mind the right of women to vote is as obvious as my own . . . .  Women on the av­
erage are as intelligent as men, as patriotic as men, as anxious for good government as 
men . . . .  [T]o deprive them of the right to participate in the government is to make an arbi­
trary division of the citizenship of the country upon the sole ground that one class is made up 
of men, and should therefore rule. and the other class is made of women, who should, there­
fore, be ruled. 
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Novkov provides no indication that she is aware of Sutherland's 
sincere support for women's rights. In this regard, she is hardly alone 
among feminist historians who have written about the controversy 
over protective laws for women. Joan Zimmerman, for example, 
suggests that Sutherland's support for women's rights in Adkins was 
insincere, but she provides no evidence beyond an apparent suspicion 
that no one with "conservative" economic views could be a true ally of 
women's rights.109 As for Sutherland's (and the Court's) acquiescence 
to restrictions on women's work hours, Muller had established the 
constitutionality of such restrictions by unanimous vote only fifteen 
years earlier, and it would have been quite remarkable for the Court 
to reverse that decision. 
As the Great Depression approached, the Supreme Court invali­
dated two more minimum wage laws,1 10 and the unconstitutionality of 
minimum wage legislation seemed settled. In 1935, the Supreme 
Court invalidated as beyond federal power the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, which set industrial wage codes in an attempt to raise 
wages and stem deflationary pressures.1 1 1  Attention shifted to the 
constitutionality of state minimum wage laws, all of which applied to 
women only. During the Depression, some states began enforcing 
108. Reva B. Siegel, Size the People: The Nineteenth A mendment, Sex Equality, Federal­
ism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1014 (2002). 
Felix Frankfurter attacked Sutherland's opinion as a "triumph for the Alice Paul theory 
of constitutional law, which is to no little extent a reflex of the thoughtless, unconsidered 
assumption that in industry it makes no difference whether you are a man or woman." 
BAKER, supra note 67, at 98 . Other critiques also lambasted the Court's assertion of 
women's equality. See Goldberg, supra note 101, at 363 ("[Tjhe comfort which the court gets 
from the Nineteenth Amendment is unwarranted. The amendment gives women political 
rights, but does not for that reason render them practically and economically equal to 
men."); Barbara N. Grimes, Comment, Minimum Wage for Women, 11 CAL. L. REV. 353, 
357 (1923): 
Will the learned justices of the majority be pardoned for overlooking the cardinal fact that 
minimum wage legislation is not and never was predicated upon political, contractual or civil 
inequalities of women? It is predicated rather upon evils to society, resulting from the ex­
ploitation of women in industry, who as a class labor under a tremendous economic handicap. 
By contrast, a defender of the decision wrote that "I feel that it is distinctly harmful to 
the best interests of women to limit their opportunities for employment and advancement by 
artificial distinctions between them and men." Charles Cheney, Protect Individual Liberty, 
50 SURV. 220 (1923). 
109. See Zimmem1an, supra note 90, at 219-20; see also V ANBURKLEO, supra note 67, at 
229 (portraying Sutherland's invocation of the Nineteenth Amendment in Adkins soleJY 
in terms of his desire to preserve "laissez-faire jurisprudence" and neglecting to note 
Sutherland's longstanding interest in women's rights issues). For a far more sympathetic por­
trayal of Sutherland's opinion in Adkins, see HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE 
SUTHERLAND (1994). 
110. Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (per curiam); Murphy v. 
Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (per curiam). 
111. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-22 (1935) . 
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minimum wage laws that had been dormant since Adkins, while other 
states passed new legislation. 1 12 
A combination of economic hardship and several relatively liberal 
Hoover appointments to the Supreme Court (Cardozo, Hughes, and 
Roberts) suggested that the issue was ripe for reconsideration. The 
Hoover appointees were critical to the result in Nebbia v. New York,1 13 
a 1934 case upholding a law regulating the price of bread, in which the 
Court by a five-four margin seemed to abandon core Lochnerian 
premises. In particular, the Court abandoned the notion that govern­
ment could only regulate prices charged by "businesses affected with a 
public interest." Because the Adkins Court had analogized the gov­
ernment's power over the price of labor to its power over the price of 
goods, Nebbia seemed to advocates of minimum wage laws like a 
promising precedent. 
Nevertheless, in 1936 the Court struck down New York's 
minimum wage law.1 14 Hoover appointee Justice Owen Roberts joined 
the conservative "Four Horsemen" in the five-four decision. The fol­
lowing year, however, Roberts switched sides, and the Court issued a 
broad opinion, authored by Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes, 
upholding a minimum wage law for women.1 15 The Court's primary ar­
gument did not directly negate the Court's protection of liberty of con­
tract. Instead, the Court narrowed liberty of contract's scope and sig­
naled its acquiescence to protective laws for both men and women. 1 16 
The Court argued that liberty of contract was merely a 
subset of liberty and could be abrogated in the public interest, as other 
Supreme Court precedents during the Lochner era had shown. Given 
economic conditions during the Depression, the Court could not say it 
was unreasonable for a state legislature to try to guarantee women 
workers in general a living wage, even if the statutory means chosen 
harmed workers who could not command the minimum. 1 17 
112. See generally Jane Norman Smith, Wage Laws Result in Unemployment, SURV., 
Feb. 4, 1933, at 5 (discussing widespread agitation for minimum wage laws in 1933). 
113. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
114. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). The NWP had filed an 
amicus brief in this case, asking the Court to reaffirm Adkins, and arguing that women's 
"Magna Charta is found in the words of Mr. Justice Sutherland." Brief of Amici Curiae 
National Women's Party et al. at 34, Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 
(1936) (No. 838). 
115. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
116. See pp. 12, 14; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 364 
(1998) ("Hughes's opinion cited Lochner with approval, accepted the idea that the Due 
Process Clause contains a principle of freedom of contract, and patiently reviewed the cases 
limiting this basic Lochnerian principle."). 
11 7. W. Coast Hotel Co. , 300 U.S. at 398-400. 
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Hughes, echoing a portion of Frankfurter's brief in Adkins,1 18 also 
asserted that when an employer pays less than a living wage to a 
worker in an unequal bargaining position, the employer is implicitly 
relying on subsidies from taxpayers, i.e., relief payments, to sustain the 
worker. "The community ," Hughes wrote, "is not bound to provide 
what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers." 1 19 Liberty , 
according to Hughes, can neither be defined as the right of a necessi­
tous worker to make a contract for less than a living wage, nor as the 
right of the employer to loot the public fisc by relying on tax money to 
subsidize inadequate wages. 
Progressives were elated with their victory in West Coast Hotel, but 
in retrospect the decision was a step backwards for women's rights. 
The West Coast Hotel Court adopted a Muller-like patriarchical view 
of women's place in society , even quoting Muller for the proposition 
that "though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be 
removed by legislation, there is that in [women's] disposition and hab­
its of life which will operate against a full assertion of those rights."120 
The sexist language in the West Coast Hotel opinion was unnecessary, 
because it seems clear that the majority 's reasoning could have sup­
ported sex-neutral minimum wage laws as well. As Novkov notes, 
"[t]he initial focus on women as particularly vulnerable workers had 
enabled the logical extension of the argument that the state could 
intervene in any relationship of employment" once the legal system 
"acknowledged inequalities in bargaining power as potentially 
burdensome for the state" (p. 224). Although superfluous, the Court's 
holding that "class legislation" could be used to "protect" women was 
1 18. Brief for Appellant in Error at xii-xliii, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 
( 1923) (No. 795) overruled in part by W. Coast Hotel Co. , 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Because this 
argument was not briefed in West Coast Hotel, its presence in the opinion leads to the inter­
esting question of whether this idea was simply "in the air" or whether Hughes was some­
how influenced by Frankfurter. 
1 19. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399-400. 
120. Id. at 394-95 (quoting Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908)). By contrast, 
Sutherland wrote in dissent: 
The common law rules restricting the power of women to make contracts have, under our 
system, long since practically disappeared. Women today stand upon a legal and political 
equality with men. There is no longer any reason why they should be put in different classes 
in respect of their legal right to make contracts; nor should they be denied, in effect, the right 
to compete with men for work paying lower wages which men may be willing to accept. And 
it is an arbitrary exercise of the legislative power to do so. 
Id. at 41 1 -12  (Sutherland, J., dissenting). He added that " [t]he ability to make a fair bargain, 
as everyone knows, does not depend on sex. Id. at 413. An unidentified NWP-style feminist 
wrote to Sutherland: "May I say that the minority opinion handed down in the Washington 
minimum wage case is, to me, what the rainbow was to Mr. Wordsworth? . . .  You did my sex 
the honor of regarding women as persons and citizens." Quoted in WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 1 76 (1995). 
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relied upon for the next three decades to uphold the constitutionality 
of laws that excluded women from various occupations.121 
Novkov contends that West Coast Hotel's reasoning permitted the 
Court to uphold broader workplace legislation, such as the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ("FLSA ").  Therefore, she argues, the longstanding de­
bate over protective labor legislation for women ultimately paved the 
way for modern workplace regulation. Novkov, however, exaggerates 
the historical importance of the West Coast Hotel opinion. While West 
Coast Hotel seemed very important when it was decided, its reasoning 
became almost completely irrelevant by the time the FLSA reached 
the Supreme Court in 1941. In 1937, when West Coast Hotel was de­
cided by a vote of five-four, the swing votes on the U.S. Supreme 
Court - Roberts and to a lesser extent Hughes - were moderate 
Lochnerians,122 with views akin to Justice Harlan's in his dissent in 
Lochner. 123 If these Justices had remained the swing votes, West Coast 
Hotel's reasoning would have been crucial in subsequent litigation 
over labor regulations, because that reasoning expanded the states' 
regulatory police power without completely abdicating the judiciary 's 
role in reviewing such legislation. 
Instead, within the next several years, the Court was taken over by 
a wave of Roosevelt appointees, all of whom were chosen because 
they could be relied upon to uphold economic regulations under 
almost any circumstances. 1 24 As early as 1938, the Court famously 
announced its view that economic regulations did not impinge on 
fundamental rights, and that only laws threatening civil liberties and 
121. See, e .g . ,  Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a law prohibiting a 
woman from being licensed as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the male 
owner of a licensed liquor establishment). 
1 22. For example, Hughes and Roberts had voted with the Lochnerian majority in New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating a law granting an ice monopoly). 
A year after West Coast Hotel, Roberts relied in part on the Due Process Clause in arguing 
for the unconstitutionality of regulatory legislation in his opinion in United States v. Rock 
Royal Co-op. Inc. , 307 U.S. 533, 587 (1939) (Roberts, J. ,  dissenting): 
As the order is drawn and administered it inevitably tends to destroy the business of 
smaller handlers by placing them at the mercy of their larger competitors. I think no such 
arrangement was contemplated by the Act, but that, if it was, it operates to deny the 
appellees due process of law. 
See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 218-25 (2000) 
(arguing that Hughes never completely abandoned "guardian review" of economic regula­
tions). 
123. Despite his dissent in Lochner, Harlan was a "Lochnerian" in the sense that he 
believed that liberty of contract was a fundamental right that should be protected from arbi­
trary government regulations. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 1 61 (1908) (Harlan, 
J.) (invalidating a federal law prohibiting the enforcement of "yellow dog" contracts). He 
was moderate in the sense that he generally, but not always, deferred to state claims that 
particular regulations were not arbitrary because they were within the state's police power. 
1 24. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1 20, at 220 (discussing Roosevelt's choice of 
"faithful lieutenants" to fill the many vacancies that occurred between 1 937 and 1 941 ) . 
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civil rights would receive anything more than the most limited 
scrutiny.125 Contrary to Novkov's claims, there is little doubt that had 
the debate over protective legislation for women never occurred, the 
Roosevelt Court would still have upheld the FLSA and other New 
Deal labor legislation with no hesitation, just as it overturned 150 
years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in cases such as Wickard v. 
Filbum.126 
V. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Constituting Workers, Protecting Women has some important 
strengths. Novkov deserves praise for considering such a wide range of 
Lochner era cases and for reading many of the related legal briefs, an 
often overlooked but extremely important source for constitutional 
history . Novkov also provides some compelling analysis. For example, 
she is one of the few scholars to recognize that Holden v. Hardy, and 
not Lochner v. New York, was the leading case on the constitutionality 
of protective labor legislation for much of the so-called Lochner era. 
The book is also very good at its primary task - explaining how con­
siderations of sex affected legal arguments regarding protective laws 
for workers during the period studied. 
On the other hand, several flaws make Constituting Workers, 
Protecting Women less valuable than it might have been. First, Novkov 
pays almost no attention to any form of economics. Admittedly , this is 
an endemic problem among nonquantitative social scientists in gen­
eral, and historians of labor especially , so it is hard to blame Novkov 
for merely meeting the professional norm.127 
Nevertheless, just a little economic analysis could have added a great 
deal to the book. For example, Novkov never seriously considers 
whether economic logic suggests that maximum hours laws or minimum 
wage laws that applied only to female workers actually aided them. 
Novkov acknowledges that some women's rights advocates argued that 
applying minimum wage laws to women only benefited male competitors 
by limiting women workers' ability to compete with men. But Novkov 
never considers an even more basic case against special minimum wage 
laws - that in a free labor market, workers are paid a wage close to their 
1 25. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
126. 317  u .s. 1 1 1  (1942). 
127.  The author of this Review has used economics in his own work on labor and consti­
tutional history. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN 
AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS AND THE COURT FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE 
NEW DEAL (2001); David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 290 (1999). 
More generally, economics is finally attracting the attention of legal historians. See Ron 
Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 L. & H IST. REV. 297 
(2003); Daniel Klerman, Statistical and Economic Approaches to Legal History, 2002 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1 1 67. 
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marginal productivity.128 Employers faced with a minimum wage law will 
necessarily dismiss their employees who are covered by that law if the 
mandated wage exceeds long-term marginal productivity. 
Novkov seems to accept uncritically the position of Lochner era 
Progressives that women industrial workers had special disadvantages 
in the labor market .:__ primarily , that most of them were young, single 
women who quit once they got married - that made them unusually 
dependent on their employers. Moreover, reformers of the Lochner 
era, and even some skeptics of the reformers' legislative goals,129 were 
convinced that workers' wages and working conditions only improved 
because of pressure from labor unions, and not because of productiv­
ity increases. The fact that few women joined or were welcome in 
labor unions therefore suggested to reformers that women were 
particularly vulnerable to exploitationY0 Under such circumstances, in 
the absence of wage legislation protecting them, it was thought that 
women workers would accept any wage short of starvation, even when 
their productivity would have justified a much higher wage. 
Yet modern economic theory suggests, and economic studies show, 
there is no correlation between overall wage levels and unionization. 
Rather, wage growth tracks productivity .131 Novkov, meanwhile, pres­
ents no evidence that women workers during the Lochner era were 
paid significantly less than their marginal productivity . In short, 
Novkov does not seriously address the economic consequences of 
"protective" legislation from the perspective of either economic 
theory or economic history . 
Novkov also fails to discuss the empirical evidence regarding the 
effect of sex-specific protective labor laws on women workers. 
128. See sources cited infra note 131 (explaining that wages are correlated with produc­
tivity). 
129. See, e.g. , Elizabeth Faulkner Baker, Do Women in Industry Need Special 
Protection? We Need More Knowledge, SURV., Feb. 15, 1926, at 531, 532 (arguing that be­
cause of low overall rates of unionization, "[t]here are many more men than women who are 
unable to demand human and economic justice before their employers"). 
130. Perkins, supra note 98, at 530 (explaining that women need protective laws because 
women do not recognize the benefits of labor unions, so it "will be a very long time before 
trade unions can force the desired industrial conditions for women"). See generally CLAUDIA 
GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
WOMEN 198 (1990) (recounting that many advocates of protective legislation for women saw 
such legislation as "an indispensable substitute for collective action by women workers"). 
131 .  F.A. HARPER, WHY WAGES RISE (1957); HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE 
LESSON 140 (1979); CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS 651 (10th ed. 1987); 
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, GROWTH AND WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST 179 (1966); 
LLOYD G. REYNOLDS ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 301, 314 (9th 
ed. 1986). Economists have found that to the extent that unions raise the wages of their 
members, the long-term gains come largely, perhaps solely, at the expense of other workers. 
ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 87-89 (3d ed. 1989). In industries with 
female workforces, any long-term gains from unionization would likely have come at the 
expense of other female workers. 
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Admittedly ,  this evidence is scanty ,  but Novkov does not cite, either in 
the text or bibliography , any of the published evidence.132 Novkov also 
shows no interest in the public choice aspects of protective labor 
legislation for women, noting only in passing that protective legislation 
was often promoted by labor unions that excluded women to prevent 
them from competing for jobs held or sought by union members.133 
Questions of political economy are not the focus of Constituting 
Workers, Protecting Women, but it's hard to see how one can a 
dequately cover the relevant subject matter without at least briefly 
examining these issues, if only to understand the mindset of important 
individuals such as Justice Sutherland who sincerely opposed protec­
tive legislation and also supported women's rights. If Novkov had 
considered economic issues more closely , she might have been more 
sympathetic to Justice Sutherland's opinion in Adkins, which was the 
strongest statement on behalf of women's equality in a majority opin­
ion of the United States Supreme Court for decades to come.134 
A second problem with Constituting Workers, Protecting Women is 
that its perspective on constitutional change overemphasizes the 
importance of legal argument at the expense of both important 
personalities and crucial political developments. Novkov never notes, 
for examples, that the relative progressiveness of the 1910s Supreme 
Court was largely a result of relatively pro-regulation Theodore Roo­
sevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson appointees, as 
well as the Progressive spirit of the age. The Court's aggressive anti­
statism of the 1920s, meanwhile, resulted from President Warren 
Harding's appointment of four relatively antistatist Justices during his 
1 32. See Elizabeth M. Landes, The Effect of State Maximum-Hours Laws on the 
Employment of Women in 1920, 88 J. POL. ECON. 476, 478-80 (1980) (arguing that maximum 
hours laws reduced women's employment, especially among immigrant women); cf Claudia 
Goldin, Maximum Hours Legislation and Female Employment: A Reassessment, 96 J. POL. 
ECON. 189, 190 (1988) (disputing Landes's conclusion); Nancy Breeen, Shedding Light on 
Women's Work and Wages: Consequences of Protective Legislation 170, 190-91 (1988) (un­
published Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research) (on file with author) 
(concluding based on study of the San Francisco labor market that protective legislation 
served to exclude women only from high-wage jobs where women had no traditional pres­
ence, while improving women's lot in other fields). The Women's Bureau of the Labor 
Department of the federal government, which depended on the support of labor unions and 
reformist women's groups for its existence, issued a report in 1928 claiming that protective 
laws created only minimal unemployment for women and aided the vast majority who 
retained their jobs. This report, and various problems with its validity, are discussed in 
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 68, at 210-1 1 .  
133. The coalition between Progressive activists and self-interested labor unions i s  an 
example of a classic "Baptists and Bootleggers" coalition, in which do-gooders and special 
interests combine forces to endorse legislation (such as Prohibition) that the "Baptists" 
believe to be morally worthy and the "Bootleggers" believe will benefit them economically. 
See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect," REGULATION: CATO REV. B us. 
& Gov'T, 1999 Issue No. 3, at 5. 
134. Siegel, supra note 108; see also Jennifer K. Brown, Note, The Nineteenth 
Amendment and Women's Equality, 102 YALE L.J. 2175 (1993). 
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short tenure and from reaction against the statism of World War I, but 
Novkov never mentions these factors. Indeed, and remarkably for a 
book (by a political scientist!) about constitutional law that culminates 
in the New Deal era, Franklin Roosevelt's name does not appear in 
the index. 
Novkov even ignores FDR's 1937 court-packing plan, which some 
historians believe was critical to breaking up the Court's 
anti-regulatory majority.135 Nor is the reader ever made aware of the 
existence of Justice Owen Roberts, whose vote in West Coast Hotel 
v. Parrish swung the Court from a five-four majority against 
minimum wage laws to a five-four vote in favor of upholding them. A 
reader of Constituting Workers, Protecting Women could reasonably 
assume that Novkov thinks that such crucial people and events were 
mostly irrelevant. 
A third problem with Constituting Workers, Protecting Women is 
that Novkov - perhaps getting a bit carried away with her research 
project - overstates the importance of the debate over protective 
laws for women in the general debate over the constitutionality of po­
lice power legislation more generally. The exaggerated import she 
attributes to West Coast Hotel has already been noted. To take an­
other example, Novkov states that "the bulk of the discussion" in 
courts about due process jurisprudence between 1923 and 1937 "cen­
tered around minimum wages for women" and "the public focused at­
tention on these cases" (p. 185). It's true that the controversy over 
minimum wage laws for women never petered out completely, and 
that the minimum wage issue was at the forefront of public debate in 
1936 and 1937. 
Nevertheless, it is a gross exaggeration to assert that the public and 
judicial discussion regarding due process jurisprudence "centered" on 
sex-based minimum wage laws for the whole 1923-1937 period. During 
this time, the Court decided many other extremely important and 
controversial cases under the Due Process Clause. The Court, for 
example, determined the constitutionality of such controversial and 
economically significant regulations as residential zoning, 136 the 
Transportation Act of 1920,137 the Railway Labor Act,138 and manda­
tory resolution of industrial disputes through government-imposed 
1 35. This conventional understanding of the "switch in time" has been called into seri­
ous question by modern research. See, e. g. ,  Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other 
Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitlllional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1891, 1896 (1994). 
136. Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
137. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1 924). 
138. Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. & N.L.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 
(1930). 
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arbitration.139 The Court also expanded its due process jurisprudence 
to non-economic areas, holding in Meyer v. Nebraska140 that the Due 
Process Clause protects the rights "to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children, [and] to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience,"141 along with other 
"privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men."142 Meyer, in tum, became the basis 
for other controversial decisions protecting civil liberties.143 
Constituting Workers, Protecting Women would have benefited 
from a more attention to such context, and more perspective in gen­
eral. The debate over protective legislation for women played a very 
important and interesting role in American constitutional, labor, and 
women's history. Its significance does not need to be embellished to 
justify the attention Novkov pays to it. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the reservations noted above, and the fact that the book 
would have benefited from a good editor, Constituting Workers, 
Protecting Women is recommended for readers interested in constitu­
tional and women's history. While it does not deliver everything the 
author promises, or that this reviewer would have liked to have seen, 
it is a cogent account of an important legal and historical controversy. 
The definitive book on protective labor legislation and women during 
the Lochner era, however, remains to be written.144 
1 39. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 ( 1 923). 
140. 262 U.S. 390 ( 1923) (invalidating a law banning schools from teaching German). 
1 41. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (internal citations omitted). 
1 42. Id. at 400 (citations omitted). 
1 43. Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that the Due Process Clause in­
cludes the right to counsel in capital cases, and invalidating the conviction of the "Scottsboro 
Boys"); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (193 1 )  (invalidating a law banning display of 
the Communist flag); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (invalidating a law ban­
ning Japanese-language schools in Hawaii): Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
(invalidating a law banning private schools). 
144. Nancy Woloch's book on Muller v. Oregon is not definitive, but it is recommended 
as an excellent and concise introduction to the controversy over protective legislation for 
women. See WOLOCH, supra note 45. 
